Negligence -- Duty of Landlord to Persons on and off the Premises by unknown
tiff recognized the ordinary risks of the game and that by electing to sit
in the unscreened section she assumed these risks. But in the Eno case"1
the plaintiff was held not to assume the risk of being hit when practice
was being held between games by several groups of plays at the same
time, some of them being in close proximity to the stands, because she
couldn't watch all the balls at once.
A distinction has recently been drawn between baseball and hockey.
The latter game is not so well understood. The puck is supposed to be
played on the ice and the danger of it being driven through the air is
not so apparent, at least to the average spectator. It has been held that
a patron may rely upon the duty of the management to furnish seats
that are reasonably safe for the intended use and that a spectator, at least
in the absence of actual knowledge of the dangers of the game, does not
assume the risk of being hit by the puck.12 On the other hand, the
greater general understanding of the national game, the greater area
that would have to be fenced if everything around the playing field was
to be protected, and the recognized preference of the majority of "fans?
for the unscreened sections all combine to support the view that the de-
fendant's duty is satisfied if it furnishes a protected place to which those
who wish security from the risks of the game may resort.
R.L.B.
NEGLIGENCE - DuTY OF LANDLORD TO PERSONS ON
AND OFF THE PREMISES
The plaintiff was struck and injured by falling glass, while walking
on the sidewalk of a busy thoroughfare. A worn sash cord, supporting
the upper sash of a sixth floor window in the building she was passing,
had, by reason of wear, given way. The sash dropped to the sill, shatter-
ing its pane of glass and causing fragments thereof to fall to the sidewalk,
where one of them struck the plaintiff on the head. When the accident
occurred and for some two years prior thereto, the building was owned
by the defendant and occupied by a tenant under a printed form lease
in which was inserted in typewriting the following covenants: "The
lessor shall keep the outside of said building in good repair, and the lessee
shall make all inside repairs, and for that purpose all window glass shall
be considered as inside." In reversing the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the plaintiff's right to re-
cover from the defendant owner for negligence in failing to keep the
premises in repair, in accordance with his covenant.'
"Note 9, supra.
'Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp. - Mass. - 5 N.E. (zd) x
(1936); James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., - R.I. -, 199 At!. 293 (1938).
1 Friedl v.Lackman, 136 Ohio St. 110, 23 N.E. (zd) 9oo (1939).
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The significance of the foregoing decision becomes more apparent
when it is compared with decisions in other cases having similar fact situ-
ations. For that reason it is believed that an examination of these related
cases is appropriate.
Liability of Landlord to Tenant
The general rule, subject to exceptions, is that where a landlord puts
a tenant in full control of the premises, he is not liable to the tenant, or
one entering the premises in the right of the tenant, for personal injuries
sustained by reason of the disrepair of such premises.2 There is an imme-
diate exception to the rule where the cause of the injury is a latent or
concealed defect of which the landlord had notice and which the tenant
could not discover by ordinary inspection.3 The rule has been qualified
further by the development of an exception where the premises are
leased for a public or quasi-public purpose. In such circumstances, the
lessor has an affirmative duty to see that the premises are free from dan-
gers which would render them unsafe for the intended use.'
A fundamental assumption in the general rule, considered above, is
the release of possession and control by the landlord to the tenant. For
that reason it is not strange to find that where the landlord retains con-
trol of a part of the premises for his own use, or for the use of other
tenants, as in the case of a common stairway or passageway, he is under
a duty to use reasonable care in keeping such places in a safe condition.'
From this it would seem not unreasonable to infer that where the land-
lord covenants to repair the premises he might remain liable by reason
of the measure of control thus retained. This conclusion is not borne out
by the majority of cases, although, as will be seen, the trend appears to
be in that direction.
The majority of courts have remained steadfast in their refusal to
allow an action for injuries to the tenant, or his invitee, caused by the
landlord's failure to perform his covenant.' In support of their position,
2 36 C.J. 204; 2 Torts Restatement sec. 355-
aShinkle v. Birney, 68 Ohio St. 328, 67 N.E. 715 (1903); Cowen v. Sunderland, 145
Mass. 363, 14 N.E. IX7, I Am. St. 469 (1888); Miner v. McNamara, 8x Conn. 69o, 72
Atl. 138 (19o9); Steefel v. Rothchild, 179 N.Y. Z73, 7Z N.E. 11Z (19o4); Godard v.
Peary, 32 Ga. App. IZI, 122 S.E. 634 (924)i z Torts Restatement sec. 358.
' Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beachs Improvement Co., 174 N.Y. 31o, 66 N.E. 968
(1903); Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 6o5, 91 Atl. z18 (1914)5 Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan.
574, 7 P- (2d) 513 (1932); Gilligan v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, z6 P. (zd) 808 (933);
2 Torts Restatement sec. 359. And see Eldridge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair,
(1936) 84 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 467,477.
'Davies v. Kelley, iz Ohio St. 122, 146 N.E. 888 (1925); HARPER, ToRTs sec. 103
(933)i z Torts Restatement sec. 361. The cases are collected in 97 A.L.R. 22o (1935).
'Berkowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934); Cullings v. Goetz,
z56 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Anderson. v. Robinson, 182 Ala. 6x5, 62 So. 5X2
(913); Grazer v. Flanagan, 35 Cal. App. 724, 170 Pac. 1076 (1917). The cases are
collected in 8 A.L.R. 765 (xgzo) and 68 A.L.R. XX94 (1930).
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these courts have offered various logical reasons. In actions on the con-
tract they say that the damages are too remote to have been within the
contemplation of the parties and are not the proximate result of the
breach." In actions in tort the theory seems to be that there is no legal
duty owing from the lessor to the tenant or persons in privity with him
except by virtue of the contract, and that a mere breach of contract will
not support an action in tort.' But in recent years there has been a grow-
ing tendency to hold the landlord responsible in tort where his failure to
meet this self imposed obligation has resulted in injury.9 Characteristic
of the attitude of courts adopting this view is the expression found in one
uf the early cases: "But where the landlord agrees to repair and keep
in repair the leased premises, his right to enter and have possession of
the premises for that purpose is necessarily implied, and his duties and
liabilities are in some respects similar to those of an owner and occupant
and if his negligence in making or failing to make the repairs results
in an unsafe condition of the premises, he is liable for injuries caused
thereby to persons lawfully upon the premises who are not guilty of con-
tributory negligence on their part.1" The rationale of the minority view
is further elucidated in the following passage: "although an award of
contract damages may be sufficient to insure the performance of the
ordinary covenant, the interest of the public in the physical well-being of
its members presents a justifiable reason for imposing liability upon the
landlord . . . when a breach of his covenant to repair creates a danger
of serious injury to the tenant's person or property.'
It is submitted that the equitable results obtainable under the minority
view fully justify a departure from the more orthodox, yet time worn,
precedents followed by the majority of courts thus far. Even in a juris-
diction where the strict rule is firmly imbedded by a succession of cases
one finds, more recently, a sympathetic attitude towards the approach
espoused by the minority." Indicative of the modern trend of authority
is the adoption by the American Law Institute of the minority view. 3
It is believed that the sanction thus given by the Institute will serve to
' Williams v. Fenster, 103 N.J.L. 566, 137 Atd. 406 (1927); Murrell v. Crawford,
ioz Kan. iS, 169 Pac. 561 (x9r8); Jordan v. Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 101 S.E. 50
(1919).
'Berkowitz v. Winston, Iz8 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934) Norris v. Walker,
xo S.W. (sd) 404 (Mio. App. 1937); Dustin v. Curtis, 74 N.H. 266, 67 At. zzo
(1907); Tuttle v. Gilbert 211fg. Co., I45 Mass. x69, 13 N.E. 465 (1887).
'Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., x58 Wis. 626, 149 N.V. 489 (914); Merchants Cot-
ton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916); Ross v. Haner,
244 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. x9z2); Pinkerton v. Slocumb, 126 Md. 66S, 95 At. 965
(xigi); Dean v. Hrshowitz, xi9 Conn. 398, 177 At. 26z (1935)-
" Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474,475, io4 N.W. z89 (19o5).
Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 383, 399.
"Cullings v. Goetz; z56 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (193).
V; z Torts Restatement sec. 35 7.
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mark the way for those jurisdictions which are as yet unhampered by
judicial precedents, and that future years will see a gradual shift to the
now minority rule which is more consonant with present day social and
economic conditions.
Liability of Landlord to Outsiders
Where the landlord surrenders control of his property to the tenant,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the tenant is obliged to
keep the premises in repair and is responsible for injuries to outsiders,
resulting from the condition or use thereof. 4 If, on the other hand, the
property is transferred in such a state of disrepair as to be a nuisance, or
when they must necessarily become so, the lessor remains liable to out-
siders. 5 Moreover, the landlord will be held liable even though the
nuisance was created entirely by the tenant, provided it arose as a con-
sequence of the use contemplated by the parties.'"
What has been said with respect to the landlord's liability to tenants
and persons on the premises when he has retained control of a portion
thereof, appears to be equally true as to persons outside the premises,
whether they be occupants of the adjoining land or merely pedestrians. 7
Thus, where the landlord leases a building to several tenants and retains
control of the roof, he will be held liable to a pedestrian injured by reason
of ice forming on the sidewalk from water discharged thereon because
of negligence in failing to repair drain pipes.'"
If the landlord covenants to repair the premises, the courts appear to
be uniform in holding him liable to persons outside the premises, for
injuries caused by his failure to make the agreed repairs.' And it has
been held recently that the same result will be reached where the land-
'x i6 R.C.L. bo63.
Shindlebeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264, 30 Am. Rep. 584 (1877); Dennis v. Orange,
iio Cal. App. 16, 293 Pac. 865 (1930); Calway v. William Schaal and Son, 113 Conn.
214, x55 At. 813 (193'); Haas v. Booth, 182 Mich. 173, 148 N.W. 337 (1914). The
use of the nuisance theory in cases involving persons on the premises has been criticized.
37 Mich. L. Rev. 1332 (i939).
asHaggert v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. 43, 35 N.E. 997 (1893); Maloney v. Hayes, zo6
Mass. I, 91 N.E. 911 (g1o) ; Louisville and N. Terminal Co. v. Jacobs, 1o9 Tenn. 727,
72 $.W. 954- (xgoz). And see: Langabaugh v. Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131, 67 N.E. z86
(1903).
' Munger v. Union Savings & Loan Assn., 175 Wash. 455, 27 P- (zd) 709 (1933);
Young v. Taleott, i14, Conn. 675, 159 Atl. 88x1; Gilland v. Magnes, z16 Mass. 581, 04
N.E. 555 (1914); O'Connor v. Andrews, Si Tex. z8, x6 S.V. 6z8 (187).
is 24 Ohio Jur. 970 (1932).
"Smith v. Preston, 104 Me. iS6, 71 Ati. 653 (19o8); Boyce v. Tallerman, 183 IIL
iiS, 55 N.E. 703 (1899); Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. B1. 35o, iz6 Eng. Reprint 590 (1794-.
And see dicta in the following cases: Burdick v. Cheadle, z6 Ohio St. 393, 2o Am. Rep.
767 (z875); City of Lowell v. Spaulding, S8 Mass. (4- Cush.) 277 (1849); Fleischer v.
Citizens Real Estate and Investment Co., 25 Or. 119, 35 Pac. 174 (1894).
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lord simply reserves a right to enter to make repairs. 20 The rule with
respect to covenants was first laid down in the English case of Payne v.
Rogers,' where an action was allowed directly against the landowner in
order to avoid circuity of action. While that case has been accepted
unquestionably in a few jurisdictions in this country,22 the theory on
which it is based has been criticized severely.23 The true theory on
which the landlord is held responsible in these cases is not that he is under
any contractual duty to outsiders, but that, because of his covenant, he
retains control of the premises, and his duty to the public is unaffected
by the lease."
It appears, then, that there is a distinction between the liability of the
landlord who covenants to repair, for injuries to the lessee, and the
liability of a landlord under similar provisions for injuries to persons out-
side the property.2"a It appears further that this distinction is based upon
the power of control reserved to the landlord. Where persons enter the
premises at the invitation of the tenant they are required to look to him
for their safekeeping, and the owner is not bound to anticipate that the
tenant will use or allow others to use property which the owner has
failed to repair in breach of his covenant. Therefore, the control retained
by the owner is insufficient to cast upon him the duty of making the
premises safe for use." But as was said in Hppel v. Muller,2 "the case
of a passerby on the public street is wholly different. In such a case there
is no need that a duty be newly created by covenant. The duty, that of
using care towards a member of the public, was established when the
landlord came into ownership of the property. It might have been sus-
pended during the exclusive occupancy of the tenant, for the power of
entry to make repairs would have been lost. If, however, there is a
Afppcl v. Muller, 26z N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785, 89 A.L.R. 477 (1933). But see
dictuv in Myers v. Peppcrcll Mfg. Co., 1z2 Me. z65, ii9 At. 625 (1923).
2 H. B1. 350, xz6 Eng. Reprint 59° (1794).
City of Lozdl v. Spaulding, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 277 (1849); Boyce v. Tallerman,
183 Il1. xr5, 55 N.E. 703 (s899); Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (189o).
SCullings v. Goetz, z56 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (x931); Harkrider, Tort Liability
of a Landlord (x928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 531, 540. Professor Bohlen in his "STUDIES IN
THE L.Aw or TORTS" (1926) at p. 2o9, argues: "It is very doubtful whether this is the true
rea-on or indeed a tenable reason for holding a landlord liable because of his covenant to
repair the exterior of leased premises. It implies that such a covenant binds the landlord to
indemnify the tenant for any damages which he may have to pay to a stranger because of
the bad repair of the premises which he occupies. It does not explain why such a covenant
,hould have such an effect, while a covenant to repair the interior of the premises is con-
strued to bind the landlord no further than to reimburse the tenant for the cost to which
he is put in making for himself these repairs which the landlord, in breach of his covenant
has failed to make."
"'May v. Ennis, 78 App. Div. 55z, 555, 79 N.Y. Supp. 896 (1903)5 Burdick v.
C1,cadle, 26 Ohio St. 393, 2o Am. Rep. 767 (2875).
: 89 A.L.R. 48o (1934).
" BOELEN, supra, p. 210.
1: .6z N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785, 89 A.L.R. 477 (x933)-
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covenant to repair, the landlord's duty to the public to maintain the
structure in safe condition, and his retention of power to perform the
duty combine to make him liable."
In the principal case it would seem that the Court of Appeals was
misled by the decision in Berkowitz v. Winston."8 That case dealt with
an employee of a lessee, but the syllabus read: "Liability in tort is an
incident to occupation and control; occupation and control are not
reserved by an agreement to make repairs." And while the Court of
Appeals recognized that this statement was limited by the facts in the
case, it felt that the same rule was applicable in the case of a pedestrian.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court viewed the matter in a different light,
although no mention was made of the Berkowitz case in the opinion.
It is submitted that the result reached in the principal case was entirely
just and in harmony with the prevailing law in the country. It is, how-
ever, to be regretted that the court considered it unnecessary to review
the status of the law on the problem. Instead, the court virtually disposes
of the case with the laconic statement: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas." W. L. A.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTION STATUTE
PER SE NEGLIGENCE - PROXIMATE CAUSE
Plaintiff sustained injuries when an automobile in which he was
riding as a passenger struck the defendant's freight car at a common
grade crossing. Both driver and plaintiff were familiar with highway
and crossing. The accident occurred at night; some witnesses said there
was fog. No special precautions had been taken by the defendant to
warn approaching motorists of the obstruction. Conflicting testimony
indicated that the defendant's employees, engaged in a switching opera-
tion, had allowed the freight car to remain in a position blocking the
highway for a period longer than the statutory five minutes. This being
a violation of G.C. sec. 7472, plaintiff contended that defendant
was negligent as a matter of law, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of his injuries.' The trial court's judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed in the appellate court of the Sixth District, and
final judgment entered for the defendant. Because of a conflicting deci-
8 528 Ohio St. 6nz, 193 N.E. 34.3 (1934).
' Ohio G.C. 7472: "A person or corporation . . . who obstructs, unnecessarily, a pub-
lic road or highway authorized by any law of this state, by permitting a railroad car or
locomotive to remain upon or across it for longer than five minutes . . . shall forfeit
and pay for each offense, not less than two dollars, nor more than twenty dollars." See
also General Code Section 7473 regarding liability of the railroad for damages resulting
from violation of the preceding section.
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